



TOWARDS A PRE-REPRESENTATION, All rights reserved. The reader may not reproduce, or by any 
means copy, electronically or mechanically, this text. Neither may it be transmitted, in any form, either in 
part or in its entirety, without the written permission of the author.
Copyright © A. Halliday 2017
First published in digital format in 2017
All  'information'  from the  real  world  is  simple  and  minimal.  Once  that
information  is  in  the  ‘visual’ processing  system  it  is,  on  following  the
general thinking, translated into a patchwork of colours often referred to as
the Representation. It is also thought that that same system constructs the
Representation as data passes through it.
In this paper I will argue that what is perceived as the Representation is
not formed out of sensory-data directly. Instead, I  will  argue that a more
fundamental structure, that I have named the pre-Representation, precedes
the  Representation  and is  formed from an accumulation  of  sensory-data,
what could be referred to as sensa1.
The philosophy of perception contains two core problems: first, how can a
fixed2,  physical-processing system translate information into a significant,
phenomenal  representation  of  the  real  world?  That  world,  a  constantly
changing environment, is much too complex to be contained in individual
packets of absorbed information.
The  second  problem  is  colour.  Although  all  colour  is  made  in  the
processing system, how can that system form  colour  into the phenomenal
contents  of  the  Representation?  At  any  one  moment  what  is  represented
might be a landscape, and at another a painting in an art gallery. To ensure
accuracy and realism in, and under, all environments, something extremely
complex must happen to ensure the perceiver has a ‘veridical’ representation
of a ‘something’ in the real world3.
As information passes into the processing system, it becomes remote from
the world. It is remoteness, possibly that more than anything else, that is at
the core of the problem of perception. If the processing system cannot know
what  the  ‘source  object’ looked  like  then,  can  that  same  system model
‘realistic’,  phenomenal  contents  on  that  unknown source?  Similarly,  if  it
cannot  ‘know’ of  real  world  objects,  then  the  same  system  can  do  no
‘likeness’ tests; for example, by comparing contents-in-the-making against
those remote objects.
Perception is not only the problem of what the perceiver can know of the
real world. What the perceiver knows is founded on the veridicality brought
to perception by the visual processing system. Yet,  it  ‘knows’ nothing —
indeed, can have no ‘knowledge’ of any kind — of  what happens during
1 By ‘sensory data’, I mean the signalling transmitted from the remote senses, such as the skin receptors or 
the retina, through the processing system and on to climax colour in the pre-Representation. I do not want 
to confuse sensory-data with what appears in the Representation itself.
2 By ‘fixed’, I mean that it has reached its maximum, physical development. Generally, the processing 
system has matured at about six months of age. It then undergoes a much slower rate of development into 
adulthood.
3 Here, I am talking generally.
both pre-vision and mid-vision – in advance of the perceiver?
To go further,  neither does that system have an internal 'object-pattern'
database, templates, against which a new patch of colour can be ‘modelled’
as  it  progresses  through  that  system.  In  other  words,  they  have  no
psychological, stored copies of all of the 'known' real objects. If they did,
where would those basic patterns come from? Where might they be stored in
that  system?  If  that  is  conceivable,  they  would  add  another  layer  of
complexity to a system that is already very complex?
There is a conceptual gulf between minimal information and the contents
of the Representation. And, that gulf is greater between that real information
and the Representation. In effect, each piece of information is minute while
the  Representation  is  visually  maximal.  It  is  natural  to  assume  that  the
processing system does all of the work of building the Representation. Once
information  enters  that  system,  there  is  nothing  else  to  create  the
phenomenal structure that is our ‘visual’ world. Indeed, the phrase ‘visual
processing system’ implies that it alone creates what is given.
One of the aims of all fields of investigation is to simplify the real world to a
human-understandable level. Therefore, if the gulf between information and
the  Representation  is  so  huge,  might  there  be  an  argument  that  helps  to
explain  away,  and  at  the  same  time  simplify  further,  the  unanswered
problems inherent in mid-vision?
Could it  be argued that  the visual  processing system does not,  in fact,
build  the  Representation?  Might  there  be  an  argument  for  a  much more
fundamental  structure,  a  pre-Representation.  That  structure  could  also  be
referred  to  as  a  ground4.  As argued earlier,  it  cannot  be  posited  that  the
processing system builds the Representation.  It cannot know, for example,
what  a  chair  and  table  look like.  The  gulf  between  information  and  the
Representation is  too great.  Given the  above,  how, then,  should the  pre-
Representation be thought of?
The  pre-Representation  is  a  ‘bridge’ between  fully-processed  sensory
data5 and the Representation. It would be a structure at, or very close to, the
end of the  visual  processing system:  of mid-vision. Although  it would be
integral to the Representation, it would be a simple ‘container’ of colour.
4 This ‘ground’ would be similar to the painter’s ground: a layer of, usually monochromatic, paint that is 
applied to the canvas prior to the painting of a subject. The purpose of the ground is to modify the colours 
painted onto it. (The painter’s ground is often white or black but colours are often used, depending on the 
final effect desired.) However, in perception, the ground could be ‘multi-coloured’ to match the visual 
processing system’s interpretation of objects in the real world.
5 Not all sensory data reach the Representation. Much of it is processed out both before it enters the main processing 
system and as it flows through that system.
Perhaps,  it  could be described as an ‘accumulator’ of processed sensory-
data: of sensa.
As a simple, patchwork of colours it would have no contents. Indeed, it
could be thought of as the opposite side — perhaps, as the candle wax — of
the Representation. An analogy is not that of the heads-and-tails of a coin
but of a multi-coloured, ‘blank’ coin that has not, as yet, had its face — the
Representation  — stamped  into  it.  The  material  of  the  coin  is  the  pre-
Representation.  [I  don’t  want  to  over  simplify  and  suggest  that  the
Representation has  two  discrete sides: a front and a back and, possibly, a
‘grey-area’ middle. In effect, I see both sides as a single structure.]
With  a  pre-Representation,  the  problem of  the  very  minimal  range  of
information becomes explainable. The role of information, then, is not the
carrying of the complexity of real objects but the transporting of a minimal
quantity of information that the processing system evolved to translate into
colour. The making of colour is sufficiently complex to tax the processing
system to near its maximum.
In content building, there would be no need for stored models, models that
would make the processing system ever more complex. There would be no
need  to  consider  how  a  remote  system  can  ‘know’,  in  advance,  which
contents should be constructed.
A datum  in  the  pre-Representation  would  represent  one  point  of  the
'colour' of an object6. As each is put in place the processing system would
not  ‘know'  beforehand what  it  is  or  what  it  represents.  There can be no
'knowledge', pre- or otherwise, in a mechanical system. A number of datum
would be, on the pre-Representation, simply, coloured points. Those that are
grouped would form patches that would vary in size: from no larger than a
few datum, possibly not perceivable, to larger areas of uniform colour that
could fill most of that ground.
Each datum would be in the correct place. Therefore, the placing of colour
would be the secondary role of the processing system after colour-making.
Colour-making is primary to perception. The pre-Representation would be
constantly  refreshed  while  looking  happens7.  Each  datum  would  arrive
separately,  therefore  the  whole  of  the  pre-Representation  could  not  be
simultaneously updated8.
6 The ‘information’ in a single light wave cannot carry all of the ‘colour’ of an object. Therefore, a single 
patch of perceivable colour should be thought of as constructed out of many, possibly millions of, discrete 
packets of ‘information’. The role of the processing system, then, would be to unify all of those into what 
would become a coloured patch that is part of a content or is content.
7 Therefore, there is also an argument that the basics of perception is a question of what, where, and when: 
i.e., what colour, where should it be placed, and when does it arrive.
8 Environmental changes reach the perceiver at different moments. Think of a sun-bathed landscape: on the
near decking are tables and chairs; in the far distance, green hills. A shadow passes over the hills. The 
Generally, perception is thought of as an immediate experience. It is also
clean and very smooth (A standard cinematic analogy might be, flicker-free).
Positing  a  ground  would  allow  time  for  minor  changes  in  the  pre-
Representation  prior  to  perception  of  the  Representation.  Sensory  data,
sensa, would have time to accumulate so that any change made to the ground
would  have  to  reach  a  minimum  significance  before  perception  of  real
change  appears in the Representation.  As the pre-Representation precedes
the Representation it, therefore, marks the end-point of mid-vision.
information from the now shadowed hills will arrive much later than the information from the table and 
chairs, still bathed in sunshine, and so on. Therefore, the pre-Representation could be important in 
‘smoothing out’ these differences.
